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ABSTRACT 
This paper singles out the late Ronald Dworkin as the legal and politicalphilosopher 
who best interpreted and represented the rise, success and fall of the age of rights. 
Three pillars are central to the age of rights: a strong liberal agenda, a powerful judi-
ciary capable of quashing legislation incompatible with rights, and a coherent theory 
singling out the special moral primacy of rights. Each one of these pillars, which are 
central to the thought of Dworkin, are now being challenged; this contributes to the 
explanation of the root causes of the crisis of the age of rights. 
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1. Introduction   
 
The age of rights is in crisis. Particularly so, now that Ronald Dworkin 
has passed away: without him, rights lose their most successful spokes-
person that incessantly tried to show their objectivity, independence and 
deep harmony. It takes great faith and hope in human rationality to be-
lieve that we can come up with a single—right—answer based on rights 
to any ethical, moral and legal dilemmas that are societies face. Ronald 
Dworkin attempted just that throughout his long career that just came 
to an end. He is the greatest of all the advocates of rights, and deployed 
all his vigour, sharpness and rhetorical verve to defend the claim that 
rights must be taken seriously and if we do so, and understand them ap-
propriately, they point our communities in the best possible direction for 
the future.  
When I speak of the age of right, I refer to an historical period during 
which rights became the central element in legal, political and moral lan-
guage; not only that: rights also made, or seemed to make, a positive dif-
ference in the way legal, political and moral decisions were taken. 
Dworkin happened to live the golden age of rights and embraced it 
wholeheartedly highlighting the strengths and achievements that could 
be reached in their name. It nonetheless seems to me high time to evalu-
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ate the contribution of rights in a more balanced light: I am not going to 
suggest that rights do not make any difference, but what I would like to 
stress that they do not seem to make as much difference as they trumpet.  
They are but another element in the moral horizon of political societies. 
Moreover, rights no longer seem to provide compelling arguments to de-
cide cases, perhaps precisely because of their success: their scope has wid-
ened beyond imagination, so each of the rights protected by constitutions 
or international treaties pull in competing –at times conflicting—
directions. Rights frame disagreement as much as they frame agreement.  
The period I am thinking about spans from 1948 to 1989, from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the fall of Berlin’s wall. The 
starting point is obvious: the international community declared universal 
rights of all human beings at the end of the most devastating global con-
frontation. The ending point is more controversial, and it will become 
more apparent later on why I regard it as such. In fact, I should say that 
it is better described as both the highest point and the beginning of a de-
cline for rights.  The decline includes various phenomena amongst which 
we can cite: the reversal of fortune of a liberal agenda of rights with the 
return of conservative forces mining the march of rights and at times sid-
ing with religious groups to counter liberal reforms in the name of rights. 
I’d like to suggest that Ronald Dworkin’s death is one of the lowest 
points in the decline of the age of rights.  
Dworkin was born in 1931, and was 17 when the UN approved the 
UDHR. He was coming of age at exactly the right time, or perhaps the 
rights time. His early maturity was characterized by the American ex-
perience of rights protection, and in particular he witnessed the very ac-
tivist, and liberally minded, Warren court (1953-1969) while it tried to 
enhance equality and freedom in the US through a judicially enforced bill 
of rights. The decline, of the age of rights corresponds to the decline of 
the model of rights’ protection as conceived in America. The American 
model as shaped by the historical events since 1948 has three fundamen-
tal dimensions: politics, law and morality. At the political level, what 
pushed forward the American conception of rights was a liberal credo 
that America wanted to spread throughout the world. The Supreme 
Court happened to be the voice of that liberal credo, and the Warren 
Court in particular was the prime interpreter of it. The liberal credo was 
at the beginning a unifying credo in the US, especially when compared 
and contrasted with the Communist credo. At the legal level, we have al-
ready hinted at it, the institution that did most of the work in spreading 
the liberal credo was the Supreme Court: this informs the second tenets of 
Dworkin’s faith in rights, and the conviction that judges are there to up-
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hold them. Finally, at the moral level- rights have become the moral lin-
gua franca in which we cast any claim of injustice within and beyond the 
state. Its success as a discursive practice is not always matched at the 
practical level –they do not always redress the injustices they address. 
Moreover, their success as an argumentative tool shows major weakness 
at the philosophical level since it is a real problem to explain the univer-
sality, force and coherence of rights at the moral level. Dworkin did more 
than anyone else to show why we’d better believe in the moral truth of 
rights and why they always point us in the best direction. His task was 
really Herculean and in many ways he singlehandedly engaged in a gi-
gantic philosophical task: to explain the independence and the unity of 
the department of value.  
Whether Dworkin was successful in that task is beyond my focus 
here. What matters is that without him, rights lose their hero and are 
likely to appear in a dimmer light,  incapable of withstanding the charges 
of their critics. I will endeavour to show to what extent the age of right as 
I define it has benefited from Dworkin’s argument and why it is now in 
trouble, if not at the last stop of that journey. Following the three pillars 
described above, I will focus on rights as part of a liberal agenda in sec-
tion 2; I will then explain the role and function of courts in enhancing the 
protection of rights; and I will then discuss Dworkin’s attempt to provide 
a unitary and independent foundation to the whole domain of value 
within which rights play a central role.  
 
 
 
2. Liberal Rights 
The age of rights was a response to WW2, the most brutal war of all 
times. Human rights were declared as the bedrock of any decent society 
in the world. To declare them was a first big step; the aim was to provide 
a common basis for all the nations, a foundation for peaceful mutual rela-
tions. But at the very same time, the world was divided into two blocs 
vying for ultimate power and for two opposite views of power: the west-
ern bloc stood for the ideals of liberal democracies and free markets, 
whereas the eastern bloc represented authoritarian states and a state-run 
economy. In this climate, each bloc needed to find and fund an ideology 
through which it could claim moral superiority. The western bloc natu-
rally embraced a liberal agenda based on first generation rights that 
aimed at protecting the autonomy and dignity of the individual. The 
eastern bloc resisted the ideology of individual rights and instead focused 
on the idea of a strong collectivity based on the idea of equality.  
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Ronald Dworkin’s coming of age coincided with the Universal decla-
ration of human rights (UDHR, 1948). His formative years as a young 
boy in America were marked by the looming presence of the war. The 
UDHR ushered in a new chapter in his life, which he embraced whole-
heartedly by becoming the greatest advocate of rights at home and 
abroad, and universally. However, his conception of rights was partisan: 
he represented better than anyone else a left-wing liberal position, which 
he incessantly defended for over 50 years. Indeed, one of his long-
standing political and philosophical battles was to reconcile mainstream 
liberal views with left-egalitarian positions. While the success of liberal 
rights is beyond dispute, their egalitarian dimension is often the source of 
bitter disagreement. Dworkin’s left egalitarian sensitivity must have been 
accrued by the seminal case of the Supreme Court in Brown v Board, 
1954, where school segregation between white and black children was 
ruled to be unconstitutional. Another seed of his vision was planted: 
courts could be the agent of the implementation of a left-wing liberal 
manifesto.  
However, the left wing liberal manifesto is based on the tension be-
tween liberty and equality. Some even insist that to reconcile liberty and 
equality is a conceptual impossibility. Isaiah Berlin, one of Dworkin’s 
main philosophical mentors, strenuously defended the idea that some-
times values conflict in a way that cannot be reconciled. Human beings, 
and human societies, have different goals that cannot be reduced to one 
single formula. If a society pursues the maximisation of liberty in one of 
its many guises, it is conceptually impossible to maximise at the same 
time, and to the same extent, equality. This is the gist of pluralism, 
which goes hand in hand with a modest conception of liberty, namely 
negative liberty - that is freedom from interference of the state in one’s 
own private decision about what makes a life worth living. In response to 
Berlin, Dworkin argued that negative liberty is not the only way of con-
ceiving of liberty. An alternative may be the following: liberty is ‘freedom 
to do whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights, properly 
understood, of others.1 You can see in this reply a very powerful, albeit 
largely rhetorical, move that combines Dworkin’s conception of liberty 
and equality with moral rights. For Dworkin, an appropriate understand-
ing of rights is what can help us mediate conflicts between political val-
ues. In fact, moral rights mark the boundaries between, and provide the 
glue for, a harmonious view of all political values. For example, when the 
state wishes to raise taxes in order to improve on the medical care of more 
                                                            
1 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
2006) 112. 
LORENZO ZUCCA 
178 
 
vulnerable people, one may describe this situation as a conflict between 
liberty and equality. Rich people would stand for their liberty not to be 
interfered with their property, while poor people would claim for better 
medical care in the name of equality. According to Dworkin, the state is 
justified to impose taxes on rich people without infringing liberty, be-
cause what they own in excess is not rightfully theirs. Here, the conflict 
between values is not so much resolved but displaced at the level of moral 
rights- in this sense Dworkin wants to focus all our disagreement on 
whether or not we are entitled to some things in the name of rights. For 
Dworkin, political conflicts in a community are solved by appeal to ar-
guments that feature moral rights very prominently if not exclusively.  
Dworkin puts moral rights at the centre of his liberal agenda, just 
like individual rights are at the centre of the US liberal agenda, and more 
generally of the agenda of western liberal democracies. Moreover, moral 
rights are not mere aspirations, but they have a clear and sizeable legal 
impact by way of constitutional interpretation. Dworkin encapsulates a 
legal constitutional development that is already clear from Brown v 
Board, the first major decision of the Supreme Court presided over by 
Chief Justice Warren (1953-1969). This court is often perceived as one of 
the most activist as well as the most liberal. The court was very active in 
three areas in particular: whenever an enumerated right—such as free 
speech—was a stake, whenever political conflict would prevent social 
progress, and whenever minorities were clearly discriminated. In each of 
these three areas, rights are deeply interwoven with the liberal agenda of 
the court. Rights are both means of the court to advance the agenda, and 
ends in themselves of that agenda.   
One right above all, the right to free speech, comes to be regarded as 
the core principle of any democracy, the individual right par excellence. 
For liberals, free speech is the guarantee of a properly working political 
system where serious and genuine disagreement is played out in public 
and is supposed to lay bare truths and dispose of wrongs and mistaken 
ideas. Free speech is particularly useful for liberals when applied to poli-
tics and political officials. The Warren Court was central in advancing 
that thesis in NY v Sullivan, where it was held that a public official could 
only win a libel suit against the press if he could prove that the statement 
was made with ‘actual malice’ and not simply showing that the state-
ment was incorrect. While Dworkin praised the result of the case, which 
makes it more difficult for the press to be bullied into burying some news 
for fear of being sued, Dworkin also criticized Brennan’s leading opinion 
that seemed to give priority to an instrumental reading of free speech 
rather than a constitutive one. The instrumental argument is the one 
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that links democracy and free speech and argues that the latter promotes 
the former, and that is why the right is valuable. Dworkin suggests that 
free speech should also be conceived as a constitutive right given that it 
sustains the idea that each one of us has moral agency and is therefore 
capable of choosing which opinions are worth being followed and which 
ones are not. To insist on moral agency and responsibility puts the indi-
vidual at the centre of the picture and the state is distrusted as a benign 
gatekeeper who decides which opinions can be heard and which ones can-
not. By denying the access of some opinions to the general market of 
ideas, the state would deny the dignity and personhood of human beings 
who are not regarded as being capable to elect autonomously what to be-
lieve in. Dworkin suggested that Brennan’s original instrumental reading 
could be expanded to include the constitutive reading of free speech- in 
other words the right of free speech ought to be regarded as both a means 
and an end. The discussion on free speech also shows that disagreement is 
possible within the liberal camp, even if the goal is common. 
Another fundamental tenet of the liberal camp is the fight for sexual 
and reproductive deregulation. This is a field within which, there was lit-
tle hope for progress from within politics, and probably explains why the 
court felt so keen to intervene and give a new surprising grounding to the 
whole debate: the right to privacy emerged as one of the core un-
enumerated rights from the jurisprudence of the court. In Griswold v 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court planted the seeds for many other great 
liberal decisions in the fields of sex and reproduction. The case itself made 
it unconstitutional to prohibit contraception between married couples. 
But the great legacy of the case is to announce a core un-enumerated 
right which will be at the centre of very many other decisions, including 
Roe v Wade (1973). Liberals in the Court thought that the right to pri-
vacy – understood as the right to make one’s own decisions about sex and 
reproduction unencumbered by the judgment of the state—was central to 
the Constitutional enterprise, even if it were not explicitly mentioned in 
the list of enumerated rights in the text. Conservatives since then heavily 
criticised the liberal activism of the court, in particular when it essen-
tially made up from scratch rights that were not even remotely men-
tioned. Dworkin makes a case against conservatives suggesting that the 
very distinction between enumerated and un-enumerated rights is bogus. 
For Dworkin, the Constitution is couched in very sweeping moral lan-
guage that is there to be interpreted; clauses referring to the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or to due process call for a great deal of further instantia-
tion, and judges are there to bring the constitutional enterprise forward 
and cast the best possible light on the text. It nevertheless remains clear 
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that if some rights are explicitly mentioned and others are not, then this 
must be evidence of the constitutional choices of the framers that are not 
fully catered for in Dworkin’s viewpoint. It seems unavoidable to suggest 
that Dworkin, as an advocate of liberal rights, had a great stake in pro-
tecting the status of the right to privacy.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, the right to privacy is again at the core 
of the most important judicial victory for the liberal camp, that is Roe v 
Wade—which established the right to abortion on the basis of the right 
to privacy. A woman should be allowed to make up her own mind about 
as private a matter as pregnancy, and the state is not justified in prevent-
ing women from choosing not to abort their pregnancy. If Roe v Wade 
was the victory of a great battle for liberals, it did not amount to the 
winning of the war on sexual reproduction and liberation. Conservative 
forces took Roe v Wade as the principal example of what can go wrong 
when the court advances too aggressively a political agenda. The decision 
backfired and the last 40 years were spent to undo the decision that is 
heralded by Ronald Dworkin as one of the greatest. This is certainly true 
from a liberal viewpoint, but it also entailed a very deep political polari-
sation between liberal and conservatives, between right and left wing. It 
also raises the question of how far can a court go when attempting to pro-
tect a right that is very controversial from both a constitutional and po-
litical viewpoint. The right to privacy contributed to further victories for 
liberals, in particular the overruling of Bowers, which gave constitutional 
approval to laws criminalizing homosexual sex in private. In Lawrence v 
Texas, the Supreme Court led by the most Dworkinian of justices, Justice 
Kennedy, found the Texas statute criminalizing homosexuality unconsti-
tutional on the basis of the right to privacy. At first sight, one may claim 
that free speech and privacy are co-extensive, and can be reduced to, 
negative liberty- but Dworkin explains why this is not the case: a politi-
cal community is genuinely liberal if it treats its individuals as fully 
fledged moral members. To do so, individuals have to take part to the po-
litical process, they have to have a stake in the political process, and they 
have to be independent from the political process even if they are subject 
to its decisions. The first two conditions are easy to grasp. An individual 
that cannot voice her concern in the political process is not a member of 
the community. And also an individual who does not see his interest rep-
resented in the political process, can hardly accept the final decision of 
the community since his viewpoint has never been accounted for.  
The third condition is more difficult to grasp, since it is hard to un-
derstand how one can possibly be independent and bound at the same 
time. Or to put it differently, how is it possible that individual freedom 
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can be furthered by collective self-government? Dworkin suggests that an 
individual endowed with self-respect and dignity understands that a po-
litical community is a common endeavour where responsibility for deci-
sion on important policies is given to an ultimate authority. He compares 
that situation with a musical orchestra, where individual musician en-
dowed with self-respect understand that for the orchestra to work they 
have to rely on the choices of the musical director. It is not the case that 
their independence is curtailed or limited; in such a situation, their inde-
pendence is compatible with the idea of being directed. Dworkin suggests 
that in political matters, it is even more so the case. People can accept 
that moral independence exercised on question of private life is compati-
ble with having issues of justice decided by a collective  body when indi-
vidual interest compete and collide and the community requires a com-
mon standard for all that compromises between divergent interests. Of 
course, in Dworkin’s view, competition and clash of interests can always 
be interpreted in a way that dispel a fundamental conflict of values and 
the compromise to which Dworkin aspires is always couched in terms of 
rights.  
We have already seen, however, how divisive some liberal positions 
could be, in particular in relation to sexual and reproductive freedom. 
The gap that was being excavated between liberal and conservative was 
to widen progressively in the 70’s and in the 80’s. What seemed to keep 
the country together was in those years the fact that the US had a for-
eign common enemy, who was particularly inimical to the idea of indi-
vidual rights from the liberal viewpoint. The fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989 gave rise to the all-encompassing crisis of liberal values in the west. 
Liberal western democracies based on individual rights had won the cold 
war, but they were likely to become victim of their own success. Once its 
competing ideology was gone, the liberal dogma was much more likely to 
show all its weaknesses and internal contradictions.  
The fall of the Berlin wall, made Isiaha Berlin’s idea of value plural-
ism even more popular and widespread. But value pluralism was the big-
gest threat for a harmonious liberal recipe based on moral rights. Not 
that Berlin’s ideas are illiberal. To the contrary, he is a very committed 
liberal and believes that value pluralism—the idea that values are objec-
tive and incommensurable—is the heart of liberalism. For Berlin, liberal-
ism should promote diversity as far as possible. Every individual should 
be protected in the free pursuit of what he thinks best for the purpose of 
his self-development and flourishing. The society should refrain as far as 
possible from imposing any overarching set of norms that would stifle di-
versity and promote one homogeneous and harmonious position as to 
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what is a good life. Value pluralism has a great explanatory power, and 
highlights the appeal of liberalism as committed to diversity, but it is also 
underlies a major challenge for liberalism in so far that it recognizes that 
some moral disagreement is the stuff of tragic conflict and there is no way 
in which all values can be made to cohere in a harmonious whole. The 
challenge is to be able to accept tragic conflicts, while devising a method 
to cope with them without polarising the society.  
In the post-Berlin’s wall world, human rights spread their wings in 
liberal democracies. The rights revolution swept the whole world and in 
two decades most countries adopted constitutionally entrenched rights 
with judicial review. These included all eastern European Countries, as 
well as most commonwealth countries including the UK itself. However, 
the spread of human rights documents and the introduction of judicial 
review has not always been an unequivocal success. In some countries, 
human rights are used as an instrument to fuel social and political con-
flicts. Societies are being divided along moral, political and religious lines 
and human rights advocates are not capable of mediating these conflicts 
in a way that does not leave moral or political residue.  
Polarisation became even starker with 9/11, which brought a new 
form of global division along national identity lines, based in particular 
on religious difference.  Religious Identity is a strong form of belonging 
coupled with a strong set of beliefs that can be hard to square with other 
equally strong beliefs. Rights in this environment are not always suited 
to help mediate between the concerns of liberal polities and those of reli-
gious communities. On sexual morality and reproduction, for example, 
old divisions resurface and liberalism’s commitment to diversity can 
hardly be squared with its commitment to sexual freedom. Value plural-
ism asks us to understand and accept other worldviews, the problem 
arises when other worldviews want to impose themselves on the rest of 
the society on the ground that they are the only ones to hold the truth 
about moral matters.  
Dworkin himself had to acknowledge that liberal democracies, start-
ing with the US, had received a massive blow in the last 10 years or so 
and came to ask whether Democracy is possible in this circumstances of 
deep moral and political division. The return of religion fuelled deep 
seated divisions and promoted confrontation rather than compromise. 
Despite his bleaker look at present day liberal societies, Dworkin insisted 
that societies need a common ground, one big idea that can be shared and 
from which disagreement can be started and articulated. The big idea he 
has in mind is that of dignity and it has two major implications. Firstly, 
dignity means to recognize the special and intrinsic value of everyone’s 
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life. Secondly, everyone has personal responsibility to make decisions 
concerning how to live the best possible life. Unfortunately, this optimis-
tic minimal common ground seems to ride roughshod over the fact that 
sometimes some worldviews are simply incompatible with others. It is 
not necessarily a holistic incompatibility all the way through, but it sur-
faces on important decisions that need to be taken collectively—such as 
the nature of marriage, the permissibility of euthanasia and other moral 
dilemmas that cannot find an answer that will appease everyone. 
Dworkin’s hope to find a common ground defies the widespread belief 
that, perhaps, the only thing there is in common is the fact of unbridge-
able pluralism.  
 
3. Courts  
Moral rights need their advocates and, more importantly, they need insti-
tutions who are likely to implement them and argue for them. Post-war 
America found in the Warren Court a formidable bastion in defence of a 
liberal view of rights. The US Supreme Court judicial activism is the sec-
ond important pillar of what I call the age of rights. Not only rights were 
declared in bills of rights, but they were also effectively protected by the 
intervention of courts. At the same time, post-war Europe, in particular 
Italy and Germany were cutting their teeth with a brand new set of con-
stitutional instruments inspired by the American experience and com-
pleted with strong power for their respective constitutional courts. Con-
stitutional courts that are composed by elites of a country tend to be pro-
gressive and liberal, and so they naturally advance a mainstream liberal 
agenda on free speech, decisional privacy, sexual freedom and procrea-
tion.  
Needless to say, courts became for Dworkin the place where it all 
happens. A liberal agenda can be carried forward in the name of rights, 
since rights are trumps against policies that are shaped by the aggrega-
tion of interests. Rights are not purely instrumental, they are constitu-
tive and they resist most forms of consequentialist (or instrumentalist) 
thinking. Courts have the power to argue in favour of rights and against 
legislation that does not take rights seriously. Judges can engage in de-
tailed arguments of principle and can apply them to the facts of the case 
to help carry forward the constitutional ethos. Courts, however, are not 
fully trained in moral arguments and Dworkin’s liberal agenda aims at 
convincing judges that they should reason with principles that are em-
bedded in rights.  
But first, Dworkin had to overcome an important hurdle: HLA 
Hart’s influential book, The Concept of Law, offers an understanding of 
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law that does not a much place for morally oriented principles. The build-
ing block of law is the notion of rules; legal rules do not invite judges to 
engage in moral reasoning. They invite them to interpret legal materials 
carefully and to apply rules to the facts by religiously respecting the 
words crafted by the legislator. Hart’s Positivism does not rule out alto-
gether the possibility for judges to engage in moral reasoning: sometimes 
rules are crafted in a way that explicitly requires them to draw some 
moral lines; so for instance the unfair contract terms legislation requires 
judges to establish the meaning of unfairness. However, the link between 
law and morality is purely contingent and does not arise if rules are 
crafted in a technical and precise way. As we all know very well, Dworkin 
attacks precisely on that point and suggests that the law is not made only 
of precise rules, the dimension of which is one of validity. The law is made 
of principles that are an integral part of any legal practice; principles are 
different in kind from rules to the extent that they behave differently 
since they do not prescribe a precise set of actions. By arguing that prin-
ciples are a constitutive part of the law, Dworkin also suggests that there 
is a necessary link between law and morality and that judges have an ob-
ligation to bring morality to bear whenever the law is unclear or incom-
plete. In particular judges have to determine the moral rights and obliga-
tions of all parties to litigation in a way that reflect sophisticated moral 
arguments. Morality requires judges to take rights seriously. 
There is another reason for Dworkin to provide a competing theory of 
law to Hart’s. A positivist sometimes has a hard time defending his lib-
eral views and arguing that the law can well be contrary to his own lib-
eral convictions and still be  fully valid. Dworkin probably found Hart’s 
position unsatisfactory when faced with Lord Devlin’s arguments on 
prohibiting homosexuality on grounds of immorality. Hart, as a positiv-
ist, was not entitled to say that the law could not interfere with individu-
als’ private choices as a matter of principle. Dworkin thought that this 
was a basic weakness of the positivist position that could not properly 
advance a liberal agenda even if it wanted to. Dworkin’s alternative an-
swer to the debate on homosexuality is to argue that as a matter of prin-
ciple, and basic rights, no individual can be coerced to behave against 
one’s own private or sexual preferences. No law could be considered as 
binding if it infringed those basic rights.  
Dworkin’s move allows him to have a direct weapon against conser-
vative moralist like Devlin. If legislation is not compatible with moral 
rights, then it cannot be regarded as valid law. Devlin on the other hand 
is simply expounding a conventional understanding of the law based on 
the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. Parliament can do 
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whatever it wishes, and in moral matters it is perfectly allowed to follow 
common sense. A positivist has to allow for the fact that law may be big-
oted and conservative. Dworkin is unsatisfied with that position and his 
theory of law incorporates as much as possible his moral position. What 
Dworkin did not realize though is that to subordinate the law to moral 
substantive views is a double edged sword: sometimes it may go in a fa-
vourable direction, but others it may just go against one’s moral prefer-
ences. Positivists in that case can distance themselves from the law and 
criticise from an external viewpoint. A moralist like Dworkin can only re-
sort to internal criticism of the law.  
The role of the court, for Dworkin, is to bring moral rights to bear on 
the interpretation of law. In some cases, like Riggs v Palmer, it is particu-
larly easy to see the appeal of that position. Someone who kills a member 
of the family in order to inherit his property as stipulated in the will is 
deemed to forebear his moral right to inheritance because of his wrongdo-
ing. Legislation could not foresee this wicked case, and was therefore si-
lent about it. The judge was faced with a gap, the positivist says. And in 
the case of a gap, the judge is empowered to use his discretion; the wider 
the gap, the wider the discretion of course, but in these cases it helps to 
guide discretion according to common sense morality. In this case, no-
body disputes what is the morally right answer; it’s a dead easy case. But 
Dworkin builds on this case the idea that law has no gaps, and no discre-
tion. The judge has a general duty to decide cases on the basis of the best 
moral interpretation, whenever the law does not provide a clear answer. 
Moral rights fill every gap of the law, because moral rights underpin the 
whole legal enterprise.  
So the job of the courts is not only to mechanically interpret rules, 
but it is also if not chiefly about balancing moral principles underlying 
the law. Principles- we are told- have a dimension of weight rather than 
validity. They do not apply in a all-or-nothing fashion, but require in-
stead that each policy be evaluated in light of competing moral principles 
that lie beneath it. If the policy produced displays appropriate concern 
for all underlying principles, then legislation is sound. Otherwise it will 
have to be invalidated in the name of its incompatibility with an impor-
tant moral concern that has been largely overlooked. It is not clear 
whether this is the ‘real’ way courts proceed, but Dworkin tried to per-
suade us that that was the case for the whole of his career. His passionate 
defence of the court reached a pinnacle when he described them as a fo-
rum of principle, a place where moral deliberation can take place in a 
controlled and judicious way.  
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Dworkin’s American audience was bound to be more sympathetic to 
Dworkin’s claim than a British audience. The reason was simple, America 
already displayed a great degree of moral deliberation on the basis of the 
rights contained in the bill of rights. But Britain lacked a formal, mod-
ern, Bill of Rights on the basis of which all law could be scrutinized. And 
for a long time, Britain resisted the temptation to bring into the law such 
a mammoth bill that would alter the relation between parliament and the 
courts. Britain was very happy that other, less liberal, countries adopt a 
written constitution with judicial review; but a standard British under-
standing of the law was that it naturally tended toward fairness without 
having judges to step in to redress the balance.  
Having noticed the erosion of that fairness in the 80’s, during 
Thatcher’s government-when the west was battling for its economic deep 
concerns, Dworkin came to realise, as many other people did, that Britain 
had vanquished its true liberal commitments that it had inherited from 
its constitutional history and his great liberal philosophers such as Locke 
and Mill. He decided to plea for a Bill of Rights for Britain. 2 Soon there-
after, in the nineties, a new left-wing liberal movement led by Tony Blair 
campaigned in favour of bringing rights home. Home here means the 
place where they originally belong, but it also means away from the 
Strasbourg’s court, which was increasingly intervening in British affairs 
to redress some basic infringements. So in 1998, the HRA comes into 
force and is the centrepiece of the New Labour constitutional reform that 
attempts to bring Britain in line with other Western Democracies. Of 
course, the point of the HRA is not so much to have a substantive im-
pact, but to alter the separation of powers between parliament and the 
courts and to this effect, the supreme court of the UK is also created in-
dependently from the House of Lords where the previous highest judicial 
formation was sitting.  
It is not clear why courts are trusted with a special constitutional 
power that would bring back rights into one’s country legal culture. This 
idea travelled the world and spread nearly everywhere, but there is no 
empirical evidence that judicial review based on rights has the effect of 
restoring, or ushering in, a new age of rights. In the words of one of 
Dworkin’s mentors, Justice Learned Hand: “I often wonder whether we 
not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, and upon 
courts. These are false hopes; believe me these are false hopes. Liberty lies 
in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no 
law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do 
                                                            
2 Ronald Dworking, A Bill of Rights for Britain: Why British Liberty Needs Protection 
(Chatto & Windus 1990).  
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much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no 
court to save it.”3 It is not clear whether the HRA 1998 can restore the 
spirit of liberty that was seemingly lost under the Thatcher’s era. It does 
not seem to be the case if we judge from the massive backlash against the 
bill in the British media, not to mention its crusade against Strasbourg.  
And perhaps, there is a small grain of truth in the muddled waters of 
British media. The golden age of liberty in the UK was not secured by 
courts, but by parliament. So why would it be sensible to hand to a bevy 
of judges issued from the very same social background the keys of the in-
terpretation of rights? Recent studies show that the rationale for shifting 
power from parliament to courts through the incorporation of a bill of 
rights is not so much a concern for universal justice, but a preservation of 
the control of the society by a bien-pensant elite that is losing its grip 
through the representative mechanism. Ran Hirschl shows this mecha-
nism very well in the case of Israel for example; the bill of right empowers 
a bevy of judges from a secular Ashkenazi elite to prevent the loss of con-
trol of the Knesset.4  The problem is that judicial institutions themselves 
have to open up and become more representative. The slippery slope is 
only slowed down, but the grip on a liberal understanding of society is a 
concrete possibility.  
Dworkin had to struggle himself with the curse of judicial power 
when it eventually became dominated by conservative minded judges 
appointed by President Bush.5 Dworkin was horrified by the prospect of 
a reversal of liberal fortune and in the last ten years, he began to attack 
the Supreme Court and in particular its republican judges. Abortion, 
Euthanasia, gay marriage and many other liberal crusades are all in the 
hands of a bevy of conservative judges who are not going to abide by a 
liberal agenda anymore. Perhaps the greatest blow was given during the 
Bush v Gore litigation, when the Supreme Court had to step in to virtually 
determine the outcome of the presidential election—obviously in favour 
of the Republican candidate. Having chanted the greatness of the Su-
preme court as a forum of principle, it became difficult for Dworkin to 
start firing bullets against it, while preserving its image and legitimacy. 
Either the court is a forum of principle, or it is the locus of politics by a 
                                                            
3 Irving Dilliard (ed.), The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned 
Hand(Hamish Hamilton 1954) 189-190. 
4 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Consti-
tutionalism(Harvard University Press 2004) 21-24. 
5 Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Supreme Court Phalanx’(August 30, 2007) The New York 
Review of Books <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/sep/27/the-
supreme-court-phalanx/?pagination=false> accessed 24 April 2013. 
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random bunch of unelected people who may happen to have liberal views 
but may just as well happen to be very conservative.  
Rights in the hand of left liberal judges will advance a left liberal 
agenda. However, in the hands of conservative judges they will only en-
trench privileges and inequalities. The problem of principles is that they 
can always go one way or another. Dworkin would no doubt welcome 
disagreement, but would be deeply upset about outcomes that are not in 
line with his political views. How upset can one be before starting to 
think that the constitutional pact is not for everyone anymore? Is it 
enough to claim that constitutional rights provide a common ground for 
everyone, when the constitution allows for major inequalities and dis-
crimination? Can there be a common foundation that is truly common? 
 
 
4. Moral Lingua Franca 
From 1948 to today, rights became the lingua franca of any talk of jus-
tice at the national and international level. The number of declarations, 
charters, bills of rights enacted in the last 65 years is astounding. Some 
experiments have had great success while others are of limited impact, 
but what is clear is that at an abstract level everyone agrees that the lan-
guage of rights is the most popular way of casting claims against actual 
or perceived wrongs. To this extent at least, we live in the age of rights. 
But there is a discrepancy between the language of rights and the prac-
tice of rights both at the national and at the international level. At the 
national level, the language of rights fuels disagreement rather than con-
tribute to the understanding of society as a common venture. It is not 
hard to understand this: if every individual can attempt to fit his claims 
in the language of rights, then any denial would be perceived as a major 
set back. Setbacks, however, are inevitable as individual interests cast in 
the language of rights will inescapably conflict one against another. At 
the international level, the language of rights is even more controversial 
as any firm understanding of what human rights could require is ines-
capably tainted with accusation of imperialism and lack of cultural sensi-
tivity. Few wrongs command universal agreement in principle—say for 
instance torture—but even then they are violated at times despite all 
prohibitions.  
The language of rights may be omnipresent, but it suffers from con-
ceptual imprecision since it applies to many different objects. Dworkin, 
for example, addresses many different types of rights: legal, political, 
moral rights of which human rights are but one species. Moreover, there 
does not seem to be a common structure to rights, even if they all have 
Exit Hercules: Ronald Dworkin and the Crisis of the Age of Rights 
189 
 
the same point or purpose for Dworkin: legal, political and moral rights 
are all grounded on the ethical notion of dignity. In Dworkin’s theory, 
political rights are trumps against collective national goals.  However, 
Human rights are not simply trumps against national sovereignty. That 
would yield a far too thin conception of human rights for Dworkin. Hu-
man rights require a precise attitude on the part of everyone, and in par-
ticular on the part of the state: people must be treated as deserving full 
respect in the name of their human dignity. Legal right is the narrowest 
term and it applies to those rights recognised by the state in legislation or 
constitutions to which we attach a number of institutional consequences 
such as the possibility for a court to strike down other norms. So as you 
can see, the structure of rights varies greatly, but their foundation is the 
same: dignity as entailing ethical independence and moral responsibility.  
Dworkin put his great rhetorical vigour in defence of an understand-
ing of rights that has a common philosophical foundation. His inner cita-
del- the ultimate idea for which he stands—is that the department of 
value through which we judge all human actions and achievements has a 
deep unshakable unity and is completely independent from other fields of 
knowledge; it has its own internal standards of truth. Dworkin’s position 
argues against two major ideas about values: firstly, he argues that val-
ues do not depend on any other deeper thought or action. Secondly, he is 
squarely opposed to the idea that values are fundamentally incommen-
surable and at times conflict in an inescapable way. The best understand-
ing of rights can recompose them in a wholly harmonious way without 
leaving moral residue. The impression though is that conflicts are always 
resolved in the direction of a left liberal agenda, Dworkin’s agenda. How 
is it possible to convince someone who’s not a left-liberal that her rights 
have been respected and her moral viewpoint has been taken into account 
properly? Dworkin is firmly aware of the fact that we all disagree about 
issues of principles, but he’s still confident that there is one best moral 
argument that is capable to display the deep unity of the department of 
value.   
I find it hard to believe that the department of value is unitary, and 
harmonious in the way Dworkin sees it. This is the case for both morality 
and law. It is hard to believe that for each hard question there is one clear 
and final answer as to which values take priority over another. More im-
portantly it is hard to believe that someone will be convinced to accept 
the idea that if we disagree it is just because I know the objective truth 
about moral values and you do not.  Dworkin eventually accepts this ba-
sic intuition and acknowledges in Justice for Hedgehogs that ‘the best 
answer on some occasion is that nothing is any better to do than any-
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thing else.’6 We reach the paradoxical core of Dworkin’s position accord-
ing to which on occasion the right answer is that there is no right answer. 
The moral truth Dworkin accidentally stumbles across is that on occasion 
values conflict and it is not possible to discern one clear ranking between 
the two. Dworkin muddles the water by suggesting that his opponents es-
cape the question by appealing to answers that are external to the de-
partment of value. His opponents would claim for example that the ques-
tion of truth in morals is not to be investigated from within the depart-
ment of value, but requires a higher—detached –meta-ethical view that 
would help to explain and track truth in a way that is independent from 
substantive questions of value. But this clearly misses the point since 
value pluralists can say that value conflict as a matter of truth about 
values without having to search for higher metaphysical or meta-ethical 
truths. So how would Dworkin arbitrate between the objective truth plu-
ralist hold and that of monists? One of them is right, and the other 
wrong- but is there an internal answer to morality that tells us who wins? 
The answer must surely be found at a higher level 
The department of value covers all the fields of practical philosophy 
and goes from Ethics, through Morality to Politics. According to 
Dworkin there is deep unity across the department of value. The depart-
ment of value is to be distinguished from the department of science, 
where the conception of truth functions in a completely different way 
from truth in the field of value. The truth of moral judgments comes from 
within- when we are searching moral truth we are trying to figure out 
what we really believe in. Seeking for truth in the department of science 
is a different endeavour in so far that it attempts to understand and de-
scribe pre-existing natural order that is external to, and independent 
from, human behaviour. In the department of value, Dworkin holds, dig-
nity is the all encompassing foundation, and common ground, that pro-
vides the basis to understand ethical questions about goodness of life as 
well as moral obligations between people, to end up with the duties that 
the state has towards individuals.  
When applied to law, Dworkin’s position is appealing for judges, but 
puzzling when it comes to the explanation of conflicts of rights. In some 
cases, rights pull in two opposite direction: freedom of religion allows in-
dividuals and groups to organize their lives on the basis of their beliefs. 
But what if their belief requires them to treat some people better than 
other simply because they happen to share the same beliefs? Is it possible 
to discriminate between people on the basis of one’s freedom of religion? 
                                                            
6 Ronald Dworkin, Justice For Hedgehogs (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
2011) 24. 
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The requirements of liberty and equality are not so easily recomposed in 
this case. It is possible to suggest intricate alternatives as to how to cope 
with this situation, but in one way or another something of value must be 
sacrificed. If it is decided that freedom of religion allows for the discrimi-
nation of people, then equality can end up being undermined. If it is de-
cided on the other hand that no belief can justify preferential treatment 
in the running of a community, then freedom to live according to one’s 
beliefs can also be undermined. I don’t believe there is one answer that 
leaves no moral residue that is one answer that satisfies all the parties 
and shows a harmonious coherent realm of value. Sometimes it is neces-
sary to choose between two equally important values, and the identity of 
the society will be shaped precisely by the kind of choices we make. The 
society as a whole has responsibility to choose between clashing values, 
and some values will be given preference over others.  
Who’s the ultimate authority when it comes to decide clashes be-
tween conflicting rights? And more importantly even, on what basis can 
any ultimate authority decide conflicts in a way that preserve the har-
mony of the department of value. Dworkin believes in a unitary founda-
tion, a common ground that we all share. We have already explored his 
idea of dignity with its emphasis on ethical independence and moral re-
sponsibility. Dworkin believes that rights have the same core and are the 
fundamental element of any polity that is committed to a proper under-
standing of value. Judges have a special role in that they have to hold 
other institutions to their overarching ethical commitment. Rights are 
those trumps that prevent institutions from taking decisions that go 
against the foundation of dignity, which is the bedrock of any liberal de-
mocratic country.  
Dworkin came back to the same point over and over again. If appro-
priately interpreted, liberty and equality do not conflict but are clearly 
compatible. This runs against the wisdom of value pluralist according to 
whom values at times are inescapably in conflict. The bottom line for 
Dworkin is the notion of hope, a deeply religious notion.7 Given that we 
can choose between interpreting values in a way that conflict or cohere, 
then he hopes that we will do everything to show that values are always 
compatible.8 The hope that no tragedy would ever occur in our societies 
                                                            
7 See Ronald Dworking , ‘Do liberal values conflict?’ in Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin, 
Robert Silvers (eds), The legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York Review Books 2001) 90 
«Perhaps, after all, the most attractive conceptions of the leading liberal values do 
hang together in the right way. We haven’t yet been given reason to abandon that 
hope.» 
8 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (See supra (n. 1)) 116. 
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flies in the face of the fact that tragedy occurs and that we need a vo-
cabulary to account for those tragedies that involve dramatic conflict of 
interests. Greek tragedy provides majestic examples: think of Antigone’s 
obligation to bury the corpse of her brother pitting her against the will of 
the ruler of the city, Creon, who has decreed that those who fought 
against the city forfeit their right of burial.  
One major challenge for rights at the international level is to escape 
the charge of imperialism and steer away from the deflating perils of rela-
tivism. Human rights are either the by-product of western ideology or 
they collapse into meaningless cultural difference. Either way, human 
rights are defeated. Dworkin is a relentless advocate of a common foun-
dation of all types of rights including human rights. This foundation is 
anything but relativistic: we’d better believe in dignity and what it 
means for each one of us. This is not to say that different legal and politi-
cal systems will make different choices about what rights to entrench in 
their constitutions; this is very much a matter of their constitutional his-
tory and independence. But in any case, those choices always bring us 
back to the basic fact that all political rights have the same ultimate 
foundation. Moreover, that foundation has nothing western or imperialis-
tic. If we think long and hard enough, dignity understood as ethical inde-
pendence and moral responsibility is truly something that we could all 
embrace as a foundation of our department of values. The problem with 
this argument at the international level is that it smacks as deeply west-
ern and perhaps even simply left-liberal. Here we have an individualistic 
conception of human nature that puts all the stress on the individual 
ability to author his own life and to make decisions that steer his boat in 
the direction that the individual wishes for himself. Most cultures do not 
have such a strong commitment with individualism. 
There remains a much deeper philosophical problem: some people, 
even and perhaps especially in the west, do not believe that the depart-
ment of value has a special independence as Dworkin would like us to be-
lieve. In addition to that most philosophers believe that even if values 
have an objective dimension, it does not mean that they exist independ-
ently from our thoughts or actions. Dworkin develops his posthumous 
argument in an interesting direction, somehow what I had always sus-
pected. Dworkin acknowledges a deep religious attitude even if he does 
not believe in god.9 To have a religious attitude means to reject all forms 
                                                            
9 Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (forthcoming Harvard University Press). 
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of naturalism,10 which according to Dworkin either equates with nihilism 
(values are only illusory) or with the idea that values exist but don’t have 
independent existence since they are based on people’s thoughts or reac-
tions. Dworkin is a profound religious atheist in that he believes in the 
objectivity of values and in their complete independence. The depart-
ment of value is completely self-standing and values have no other foun-
dation but themselves. Dworkin stretches this metaphor to the idea that 
we have faith in the existence of the department of value. If you cannot 
see that, you simply lack that faith.  
Human rights, however, do not depend on the existence of god. This 
is also very clear for Dworkin. He’s not simply articulating a classic thesis 
of the religious foundations of human rights. It is not an issue of having 
rights simply because we have been created in the image of a god that is 
source of all good and evil. In order to know whether god is good, we need 
an independent premise to our reasoning. Here Dworkin’s argument is 
distinctively Humean. Dworkin would like to show that religion itself has 
two distinctive tasks that can be presented as distinctive department of 
knowledge. One is the science part of religion that tells us several things 
about the origin and existence of the world and the way in which god has 
shaped it. The other part of religion is the department of value and con-
cerns the way in which human should behave. Dworkin argues that even 
for religious people, there is no connection of cause and effect between the 
department of science and that of value. We are entitled to believe or not 
to believe in the existence of god and in his omnipotence; however, god’s 
omnipotence in the natural world does not warrant his inherent goodness 
or evil. In order to know that, we need an independent premise that is in-
ternal to the department of value and therefore independent from the 
faith in the existence of god. People who display a religious attitude have 
independent faith in the existence of objective, independent values and 
this does not require faith in the existence of god. So both theistic reli-
gious people and atheistic religious people share more than we think 
when it comes to values. In effect they both share a faith in values (in 
their objectivity and independence), according to Dworkin. 
Dworkin’s religious attitude of hope and faith is what is making the 
hard work in the construction of the domain of value. Faith is what ex-
plains the independence of the department of value and hope explains its 
inner harmony. We can also suggest that, for Dworkin, rights are based 
on the same premises. To believe in the foundation of human rights is to 
                                                            
10 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Religion Without God’(April 4, 2013) The New York Review of 
Books  <http://www.nybooks.com/article/archives/2013/apr/04/religion-without-
god/?pagination=false> accessed 24 April 2013 
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suggest that we have faith in a universal commitment to treat human be-
ings in a certain way—i.e. with full respect that flows from a proper un-
derstanding of human dignity. Moreover, to believe that rights can al-
ways be composed in a harmonious whole relies on the hope that we can 
always prevent tragedies and promote happy endings.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The age of right as I defined it owes much to Ronald Dworkin who em-
braced it and interpreted in the best possible light he could. Rights be-
came the quintessential tool to bring forward a left wing liberal reform of 
the society. Through rights implemented by national supreme courts, 
many liberal battles have been won in matters of individual independ-
ence, sexual and reproductive morality and equality between different 
people. To win battles, however, does not mean to promote a society that 
is cohesive and harmonious; on the contrary, American society, and the 
west in general grew more and more divided especially in the last twenty 
years. Rights can advance agendas but they cannot achieve moral and 
political unity. Dworkin, like a greek tragic hero, is rolling the rock of 
rights up against the mountain of disagreement and polarization.  
Dworkin’s work is monumental in scope and ambition. A modern 
hero of liberal democracies, he never gave up the fight for justice in the 
name of rights.  Dworkin never gave up hope and faith that a better soci-
ety could be fashioned in the image of the objective realm of moral values 
he believes in. Part of his optimism was due to the historical period 
within which he grew up. The American model of judicial review of rights 
had made important advancements towards a more liberal and more 
equal polity at home, and inspired many other liberal democracies to 
move on with their own liberal agenda.  
But any hero has his own Achilles’ heel. Dworkin’s is the overinflated 
confidence in what rights can achieve. Rigths are a moral element of a 
much wider universe. Also rights can have a varying gravitational pulls- 
and they can hardly all go in one direction—harmoniously and without 
clashing one with another. This basic point requires an argument that 
cannot be made from within the department of value, as Dworkin would 
like us to believe. Either value pluralists are right or Dworkin is right; 
but what would help deciding this disagreement? Would we need a court 
of principle to establish the winner?  
Exit Hercules: with Dworkin passes away the most articulate, ener-
getic, passionate advocate of rights in the XX century. The beauty of his 
speech and the force of his convictions will inspire many people, and will 
most probably remain unequalled. It is in this spirit that I argued that 
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the golden age of right through which Dworkin lived and which he inter-
preted so well is now coming to a close. Exit Hercules from the stage. Just 
like in a Greek tragedy, the light goes off and it all just look like a dream. 
A very noble dream.  
 
 
